## Draft Patrol Incident Analysis and Staffing Analysis

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Final
Police Chief Maris Herold Boulder Police Department

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This report was authored by Troy C. Payne under contract with the Boulder Police Department. Points of view in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of the Boulder Police Department or the City of Boulder.

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## Executive summary

This report describes an analysis of the Boulder Police Department's (BPD) workload over the years 2013-2020 and provides a workload-based staffing model based on that analysis. The report finds that BPD's workload has shifted substantially from 2013 to 2020, toward more property crime and violent crime and away from traffic stops. Property crime incidents have increased by $40 \%$ over this period, while violent crime incidents have increased by $60 \%$. Nevertheless, the total number of incidents has declined. Despite an overall declining number of incidents, the change in the nature of the workload has increased the average officer time spent per incident and increased the average number of officers who are required to handle an incident. Friday, Saturday, and Sunday nights are the most busy times in terms of number of incidents, with substantial variation by incident type and District.

After examining BPD's current staffing and historical workload, the following recommendations were offered using a common best-practice framework for police staffing:

BPD should add between 8 and 14 patrol officers (total) to Watches II and III. Watch II (14000000 hours) is particularly understaffed; priority should be given to increasing patrol officers on Watch II. Citizen demand for reactive police services continues through the early hours of Watch III (2100-0700 hours) with a steep reduction in demand after 0300. Given current vacancies across all sworn positions, approximately 30 new officers are required to achieve the suggested patrol staffing. This requires hiring 18-19 new officers in each of the next five years assuming a $5 \%$ attrition rate due to normal retirement of officers and recruit attrition.

Vacant patrol positions should be filled, and BPD should focus on recruitment and retention of officers. This report focuses on the patrol function, but vacancies across all sworn positions in BPD impact the agency's ability to staff patrol positions. While recruitment and retention are national problems for police in 2022, BPD's current vacancy rate is concerning.

BPD may not be able to maintain its current specialized units and should consider disbanding some units if current sworn staffing cannot be increased. Like patrol, each specialized unit also has vacant positions. Some units have dwindled to an unsustainably low number of officers, especially after shift relief and scheduled leave are considered. The Boulder Police Department and City of Boulder may be facing difficult decisions regarding specialized units and the functions they perform if sworn staffing cannot be increased.

BPD should continue to enhance its problem-solving capabilities to address increasing crime. Findings from the historic incident analysis showed a steady increase in crime over the study period. BPD should continue to invest resources in sworn and civilian employees to enable the continued development of evidence-based policing practices such as problemoriented policing that require advanced data analysis combined with engagement of relevant community stakeholders.

## Introduction

This report describes Boulder, Colorado Police Department (BPD) patrol workloads and provides suggestions for police patrol staffing. This police patrol incident analysis and staffing analysis report describes trends in the dispatch data provided by the Boulder Police Department and provides police patrol staffing estimates based on that analysis. This report is meant to provide guidance to the City of Boulder and the Boulder Police Department when making police patrol staffing decisions. Determining optimal police patrol staffing is not a simple process, and the recommendations in this report should be taken into consideration with other departmental goals.

The report begins by examining trends in patrol workloads, finding large changes in the nature of BPD's workload from 2013-2020. This workload analysis informs a data-driven approach to staffing presented in the second half of the report. The report is meant to provide guidance to the City of Boulder and Boulder Police Department executives for medium-term planning.

The staffing recommendations are based on past workloads, which are generally a good measure of future workloads - but not always. As the first sections of the report show, BPD's workload is slowly changing over time. This report's recommended staffing levels should therefore be one input among many that BPD should consider when making decisions about how to allocate BPD sworn officers.

This report is limited to police patrol and BPD's Traffic Unit. BPD patrol officers are primarily tasked with responding to citizen requests for service. The Traffic Unit has a more proactive workload, but traffic officers also respond to traffic collisions and a small number of other reactive incidents. BPD has several other more specialized units, including the Neighborhood Impact Team, Mall Unit, Homeless Outreach Team, Detectives, and the Drug Task Force, among others. These units either have a largely proactive workload, or as in the case of Detectives, a workload that is not measurable using the same data considered for this report. Staffing for these units is not considered in this report, other than noting that the existing vacancies in nearly all of these units may impact BPD's ability to increase patrol officer staffing.

This report begins by examining historical patrol workloads for BPD officers using computeraided dispatch data provided by BPD. The report then describes the Rule of 60 method for determining optimal police staffing, a best-practice method in common use throughout police departments in the United States.

## Number of incidents per year

The Boulder Police Department serviced ${ }^{1}$ an average of 56,738 incidents per year 2013-2020, including both proactive and reactive incidents. The total number of incidents was highest in 2014 with 64,399 incidents, and lowest in 2020 at 50,441 incidents in that year. Overall, there has been a $21.4 \%$ decrease in the annual number of incidents BPD responds to each year over the period 2013-2020. This overall decline masks increases in some categories of incidents while others decreased, as discussed below.

Figure 1: Annual number of incidents

Annual Number of Incidents Boulder Police Department 2013-2020


## Proactive and reactive incidents by year

From 2013 to 2020, there was a marked shift in activity from proactive incidents to reactive incidents. Proactive incidents include traffic stops, pedestrian contacts, foot patrol, and other officer-initiated activity. In 2013, nearly half of BPD's workload (46.8\%) was proactive. By 2020, just $25.7 \%$ of BPD incidents were proactive. Reactive incidents, those in which citizens have requested service, increased from half (47.9\%) to more than two-thirds (70.5\%) of incidents over the same period. Traffic collisions and 911 hang ups have remained a relatively

[^0]stable proportion of BPD workload, except for reduced collisions in 2020, presumably from reduced vehicular traffic due to COVID-19 mitigation policies.

Table 1: Proactive and reactive incidents by year

|  | $\mathbf{2 0 1 3}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 4}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 5}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 6}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 7}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 8}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 9}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 2 0}$ | Total |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 911 Hang up | $1.6 \%$ | $1.6 \%$ | $1.6 \%$ | $1.6 \%$ | $1.6 \%$ | $1.8 \%$ | $1.8 \%$ | $1.3 \%$ | $1.6 \%$ |
| Proactive | $46.8 \%$ | $45.5 \%$ | $41.7 \%$ | $39.2 \%$ | $31.8 \%$ | $30.8 \%$ | $27.8 \%$ | $25.7 \%$ | $36.5 \%$ |
| Reactive | $47.9 \%$ | $49.4 \%$ | $52.6 \%$ | $55.2 \%$ | $62.2 \%$ | $63.1 \%$ | $66.6 \%$ | $70.5 \%$ | $58.2 \%$ |
| Traffic collision | $3.7 \%$ | $3.5 \%$ | $4.0 \%$ | $3.9 \%$ | $4.4 \%$ | $4.2 \%$ | $3.8 \%$ | $2.4 \%$ | $3.7 \%$ |
| Total | $\mathbf{1 0 0 . 0 \%}$ | $\mathbf{1 0 0 . 0 \%}$ | $\mathbf{1 0 0 . 0 \%}$ | $\mathbf{1 0 0 . 0 \%}$ | $\mathbf{1 0 0 . 0 \%}$ | $\mathbf{1 0 0 . 0} \%$ | $\mathbf{1 0 0 . 0} \%$ | $\mathbf{1 0 0 . 0 \%}$ | $\mathbf{1 0 0 . 0 \%}$ |

## Number of incidents by type

The types of incidents that BPD responds to have changed over time. The data BPD provided included over 100 distinct incident types, which were categorized into 14 types for analysis. See page 32 for how each original call type was categorized for analysis.

From 2013 to 2020, there was a marked shift in activity from proactive incidents to reactive incidents. Proactive incidents include traffic stops, pedestrian contacts, foot patrol, and other officer-initiated activity. In 2013, nearly half of BPD's workload (46.8\%) was proactive. By 2020 , just 25.7 \% of BPD incidents were proactive. Reactive incidents, those in which citizens have requested service, increased from half (47.9\%) to more than two-thirds (70.5\%) of incidents over the same period. Traffic collisions and 911 hang ups have remained a relatively stable proportion of BPD workload, except for reduced collisions in 2020, presumably from reduced vehicular traffic due to COVID-19 mitigation policies.

# Monthly Number of Property Incidents <br> Boulder Police Department 1/2013-8/2021 



Violent incidents also increased from 2013-2020, from 1,700 to 2,750, an increase of $60 \%$. This increase was broad-based, with a 16\% increase in assaults ${ }^{2}$, a 34\% increase in domestic disturbances ${ }^{3}$, a $100 \%$ increase in harassment incidents ${ }^{4}$, a $525 \%$ increase in menacing ${ }^{5}$ (from very small numbers in 2013), a 34\% increase in shots heard ${ }^{6}$, and a $98 \%$ increase in weapons incidents ${ }^{7}$. Like the increase in property incidents, this increase in violent incidents has been relatively smooth over the period 2013-2020. Also like property incidents, there is a strong seasonal component to the trend, and the general trend has continued into 2021.

[^1]> Monthly Number of Violent Incidents Boulder Police Department 1/2013-8/2021


The police incident data examined here are more inclusive than what agencies report to the FBI's Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) program that may be more familiar to some readers. Similar changes are seen in summary data reported to the FBI Uniform Crime Reports program ${ }^{8}$ as well: NIBRS property crimes increased $36 \%{ }^{9}$ from 2013-2020. NIBRS violent crimes increased $57 \%{ }^{10}$ over the same period.

As these reactive incidents increased, proactive contacts with the public have declined. From 2013-2020, the number of non-traffic proactive incidents has dropped by more than 59\%, from more than 8,000 in 2013 to 3,200 in 2020. Both officer-initiated events and pedestrian contacts have declined. Traffic incidents have also declined, with nearly all of the decline coming from traffic stops (from nearly 20,000 incidents in 2013 to 6,300 in 2020).

Like the changes in property and violent crime incidents, the change in traffic incidents is steady over the years 2013-2020. Figure 4 shows the monthly number of traffic stop incidents

[^2]and all other traffic incidents including collisions, DUI, and other incidents in which a sworn BPD unit responded.

Figure 4: Monthly Traffic Incidents

## Number of Traffic Incidents by Type Boulder Police Department 1/2013-8/2021



Taken together, the increase in property and violence incidents while non-traffic proactive and traffic stops have declined suggests that BPD officers likely have less discretionary time in 2021 than they did in 2013.

The decline in traffic stops coincides with an increase in photo red light and photo radar citations from 2013-2021. Monthly data for these citations was not available at the time of this writing. Annual data were available, however, and show stable speed photo enforcement citations and increasing photo red light enforcement citations through 2019. Red light photo enforcement citations increased 108\% (from 15,932 in 2013 to 33,145 in 2019).


## Traffic enforcement by the traffic unit

The decrease in traffic enforcement, primarily through traffic stops, raised several questions during meetings with BPD command. One key question was to what extent the traffic unit was able to focus on traffic activities. Dispatch does not record BPD officer assignment to traffic versus patrol, so we are not able to provide a complete accounting of the traffic unit's workload over the entire study period. BPD was able to provide shift assignments from January and June 2019, however, and the remainder of this section describes the traffic unit's workload using just those two months. There was a total of 8,655 incidents during January 2019 and June 2019.

During hours when traffic units are active (0600-1900) in January and June of 2019, there were 5,792 incidents with one or more sworn units. The traffic unit's overall workload was $72 \%$ proactive. Most of this proactive work consisted of traffic stops (1,280 total), $70 \%$ of which (907) were performed solely by officers assigned to the traffic unit (i.e., only traffic unit officers arrived at the scene). Traffic unit officers also handled most traffic collisions: 65\% of the 229 total collisions during these hours were handled exclusively by traffic unit officers.

Traffic unit officers were never the sole units on scene for violent incidents and were rarely present at violent incidents at all. Just eight violent incidents had a mix of patrol and traffic units responding in January and June 2019, all of which were in-progress or just occurred incidents. Traffic unit officers were the sole officers on-scene at two property crime incidents, a suspicious person in-progress and a trespassing in-progress. Another 14 incidents included
a mix of traffic unit and patrol units on-scene, all of which were either in-progress or just occurred.

While BPD officers assigned to traffic duty were generally able to focus on traffic in January and June of 2019, the traffic unit's size has decreased over time. The traffic unit is split in two shifts and as of December 2021 has one sworn vacancy on the 0630-1630 shift and three sworn vacancies on the 0900-1900 shift.

## Average officer time per incident by year and type of incident

As the type of incidents in BPD's workload has changed over time, the average officer time spent at each incident has changed as well. The average number of officer-minutes per incident has increased from 37.8 minutes in 2013 to 46.5 minutes in 2020 and 45.2 minutes in 2021. The percentage of incidents with more than one officer on-scene increased from $26 \%$ in 2013 to 35\% in 2020.

Table 2: Officer time per incident and percent of incidents with more than one officer by year (all incidents)

| Year <br> Avg. Officer-minutes <br> per incident | Percent incidents more <br> than 1 officer |  |
| ---: | ---: | ---: |
| $\mathbf{2 0 1 3}$ | 37.8 | $26 \%$ |
| $\mathbf{2 0 1 4}$ | 38.9 | $28 \%$ |
| $\mathbf{2 0 1 5}$ | 43.2 | $28 \%$ |
| $\mathbf{2 0 1 6}$ | 44.8 | $28 \%$ |
| $\mathbf{2 0 1 7}$ | 47.4 | $30 \%$ |
| $\mathbf{2 0 1 8}$ | 49.5 | $32 \%$ |
| $\mathbf{2 0 1 9}$ | 47.5 | $33 \%$ |
| $\mathbf{2 0 2 0}$ | 46.5 | $35 \%$ |
| $\mathbf{2 0 2 1}$ | 45.2 | $34 \%$ |
| Overall average | $\mathbf{4 4 . 2}$ | $\mathbf{3 0 \%}$ |

The changes in incident types over time discussed in the prior section help to explain why BPD officers are spending more time at each incident on average, and why incidents are more likely to have multiple officers arrive. In general, the incident types that have increased since 2013 are both more time-consuming on average and are more likely to involve multiple officers than the incident types that have decreased. A complete table with average officer-minutes, average number of officers, and percentage of incidents with more than one officer responding is shown in the Appendix in Table 13.

## Average time between incidents

While the types of incidents were changing, the amount of time between incidents was also decreasing as shown in Table 3. On average, the number of minutes between calls (i.e., the elapsed time between clearing one incident and being assigned another) decreased from 42 minutes in 2013 to 36 minutes in 2020, but this average is driven by large outliers. Half of the durations to the next incident were 14 minutes or less in 2013, and this fell to 12 minutes or less in 2020.

Table 3: Average and median minutes between incidents by year

| Year | Average | 50th <br> percentile |
| ---: | ---: | ---: |
| $\mathbf{2 0 1 3}$ | 42 | 14 |
| $\mathbf{2 0 1 4}$ | 41 | 13 |
| $\mathbf{2 0 1 5}$ | 40 | 12 |
| $\mathbf{2 0 1 6}$ | 38 | 12 |
| $\mathbf{2 0 1 7}$ | 38 | 11 |
| $\mathbf{2 0 1 8}$ | 36 | 11 |
| $\mathbf{2 0 1 9}$ | 37 | 12 |
| $\mathbf{2 0 2 0}$ | 36 | 12 |
| $\mathbf{2 0 2 1}$ | 38 | 13 |
| Total | 38 | 12 |

## Number of incidents by hour of day and day of week ${ }^{11}$

Figure 6: Percent of all incidents by hour, 2018-2020

Percent of incidents by hour, 2018-2020


As is typical in most agencies, BPD incident volume was not constant throughout the day. The number of incidents increases from 0700 through 1100 hours, plateaus until 1400 , increases from 1400 through 1600, gradually tapering off until 2200 before increasing again at 2300 . This is shown in Figure 6 as a radar chart and in Table 4 as the annual average number of incidents within each hour.

[^3]| Hour | Percent of incidents, 2018-2020 | Total number of incidents 2018-2020 | Average annual incidents in hour | Average daily incidents starting in hour |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 06 | 2\% | 2,792 | 931 | 2.5 |
| 07 | 3\% | 5,019 | 1,673 | 4.6 |
| 08 | 4\% | 6,397 | 2,132 | 5.8 |
| 09 | 4\% | 6,534 | 2,178 | 6.0 |
| 10 | 5\% | 7,488 | 2,496 | 6.8 |
| 11 | 5\% | 7,726 | 2,575 | 7.1 |
| 12 | 5\% | 7,590 | 2,530 | 6.9 |
| 13 | 5\% | 7,447 | 2,482 | 6.8 |
| 14 | 5\% | 7,867 | 2,622 | 7.2 |
| 15 | 6\% | 8,719 | 2,906 | 8.0 |
| 16 | 5\% | 8,453 | 2,818 | 7.7 |
| 17 | 5\% | 8,174 | 2,725 | 7.5 |
| 18 | 5\% | 7,607 | 2,536 | 6.9 |
| 19 | 5\% | 7,332 | 2,444 | 6.7 |
| 20 | 4\% | 6,873 | 2,291 | 6.3 |
| 21 | 4\% | 6,779 | 2,260 | 6.2 |
| 22 | 6\% | 8,526 | 2,842 | 7.8 |
| 23 | 6\% | 8,582 | 2,861 | 7.8 |
| 00 | 5\% | 7,149 | 2,383 | 6.5 |
| 01 | 4\% | 5,726 | 1,909 | 5.2 |
| 02 | 3\% | 4,487 | 1,496 | 4.1 |
| 03 | 2\% | 2,883 | 961 | 2.6 |
| 04 | 1\% | 2,223 | 741 | 2.0 |
| 05 | 1\% | 1,992 | 664 | 1.8 |

Figure 7 shows a heatmap by hour of day and day of week. Call volumes tend to be higher Thursday through Saturday nights (2200-0100) relative to other days, as is typical for most municipal police departments in the US.

Figure 7: Average annual incidents 2018-2020 by hour of day and day of week

| Hour | Day of week |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Mon | Tue | Wed | Thu | Fri | Sat | Sun |
| 06 | 123 | 136 | 142 | 128 | 138 | 123 | 140 |
| 07 | 225 | 245 | 264 | 250 | 252 | 245 | 192 |
| 08 | 295 | 350 | 388 | 362 | 316 | 220 | 201 |
| 09 | 305 | 359 | 363 | 369 | 318 | 242 | 222 |
| 10 | 341 | 403 | 421 | 409 | 365 | 309 | 247 |
| 11 | 327 | 386 | 462 | 428 | 381 | 330 | 260 |
| 12 | 323 | 379 | 416 | 435 | 391 | 307 | 279 |
| 13 | 321 | 379 | 408 | 416 | 354 | 327 | 278 |
| 14 | 380 | 396 | 422 | 410 | 358 | 352 | 305 |
| 15 | 393 | 445 | 426 | 473 | 429 | 420 | 319 |
| 16 | 387 | 416 | 404 | 434 | 425 | 426 | 326 |
| 17 | 378 | 384 | 387 | 436 | 399 | 416 | 325 |
| 18 | 333 | 336 | 368 | 382 | 398 | 420 | 299 |
| 19 | 312 | 315 | 356 | 369 | 396 | 404 | 292 |
| 20 | 285 | 278 | 337 | 360 | 364 | 391 | 276 |
| 21 | 280 | 272 | 311 | 352 | 370 | 396 | 278 |
| 22 | 307 | 311 | 382 | 451 | 518 | 521 | 352 |
| 23 | 294 | 311 | 339 | 484 | 572 | 552 | 309 |
| 00 | 268 | 234 | 245 | 301 | 403 | 459 | 473 |
| 01 | 230 | 183 | 198 | 224 | 308 | 386 | 380 |
| 02 | 172 | 156 | 156 | 182 | 226 | 306 | 297 |
| 03 | 122 | 107 | 107 | 113 | 140 | 187 | 185 |
| 04 | 98 | 89 | 86 | 86 | 116 | 134 | 132 |
| 05 | 86 | 92 | 87 | 83 | 101 | 106 | 109 |

The hour of day and day of week patterns vary by incident type. Figure 8 shows a similar heat map for select incident types. Violent incidents appear to be spread throughout the week during 1200 to 0000 hours. Property incidents are similarly spread out, with slight increases Friday and Saturday nights. Nuisance calls are far more common Thursday through Saturday from 2100 though 0200 hours than at other days/times. Medical and assist incidents are more frequently during weekdays in the middle of the day than at other times. Reactive traffic incidents (mostly collisions) are more common during rush hour throughout the workweek, while proactive traffic incidents (mostly traffic stops) are more common mid-day mid-week.

Figure 8: Average annual incidents 2018-2020 by hour of day and day of week by type


## Incidents by district ${ }^{12}$

BPD's patrol area is split into five districts. As shown in Table 5, Districts 2 and 3 had more incidents than other districts in the years 2018-2020.

Table 5: Incidents by district

| District | $\mathbf{2 0 1 8}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 9}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 2 0}$ | Total |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| BP01 | 7,339 | 6,940 | 7,250 | $\mathbf{2 1 , 5 2 9}$ |
| BP02 | 11,848 | 12,760 | 12,013 | $\mathbf{3 6 , 6 2 1}$ |
| BP03 | 18,253 | 17,743 | 16,725 | $\mathbf{5 2 , 7 2 1}$ |
| BP04 | 8,624 | 8,934 | 9,077 | $\mathbf{2 6 , 6 3 5}$ |
| BP05 | 4,967 | 4,600 | 4,687 | $\mathbf{1 4 , 2 5 4}$ |
| Other | 973 | 943 | 689 | $\mathbf{2 , 6 0 5}$ |
| Total | $\mathbf{5 2 , 0 0 4}$ | $\mathbf{5 1 , 9 2 0}$ | $\mathbf{5 0 , 4 4 1}$ | $\mathbf{1 5 4 , 3 6 5}$ |

The pattern of incidents by hour of day and day of week was different across the five districts. District 3 had dramatically more incidents weekend nights than at other times. District 1 had more incidents during weekend nights than at other times, but the differences between weekend nights and weekday afternoons was less dramatic than in District 3. District 2's most busy time was around 1400 to 1700 hours through the week, with a higher number of incidents on Friday and Saturday nights than through the work week. District 4 and District 5 were most busy in the middle of the day, in the middle of the week.

[^4]

## Summary of historic workload for the Boulder Police Department

The Boulder Police Department's workload has changed substantially since 2013. BPD officers are servicing fewer overall incidents in more recent years (2019-2020), with the overall number of incidents down $21.4 \%$ from 2013-2020. There do not appear to be strong 2020-only effects in this reduction. The reduction in incidents is primarily from a dramatic reduction in traffic stops, while property and violent crime incidents have both seen broad-based increases.

Overall incidents are down due to reductions in proactive incidents and traffic incidents, with both down more than $50 \%$ from 2013 to 2020. As with the overall number of incidents, these changes in workload are consistent over multiple years, and do not appear to be limited to 2020. This compositional change has impacts on the number of officers required and the nature of the work that officers do. Property and violent incidents take longer to clear than traffic and proactive incidents, on average. Both properly and violent incidents are far more likely than traffic incidents to involve more than one officer as well. The net effect has been to increase the average officer time per incident by nearly seven and a half officer-minutes from 2013 to 2020. The percentage of incidents with more than one officer responding has also increased from $26 \%$ to $35 \%$ over the same period.

Across all districts, BPD is most busy Thursday, Friday, and Saturday nights, from about 2100 to 0100. This increase in workload is not spread equally across all incident types; the increase on weekends is driven largely by nuisance incidents. The workload is also not spread equally across districts, with District 3 servicing more incidents than other districts followed by District 2. The hourly workload also varies by district. While District 3 and District 1 see an increase in workload on weekend evenings, mid-week and mid-day are busier in Districts 2, 4, and 5 .

## A workload-based method to estimating police patrol staffing and the Rule of 60 approach

There are several factors that impact the staffing level required by a police department. These factors include community preferences, legal and cultural context, and available resources, all of which vary across jurisdictions in the US. Simple estimates such as the ratio of police officers to residential population is generally inadvisable in the modern era, especially as the use of computer-aided dispatch and other advances in record keeping and data analysis have made accurate estimates or direct measurement of police workloads possible. The International City/Count Management Association (ICMA) and International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) therefore suggest that agencies estimate patrol staffing needs on past police patrol workloads.

Measuring past workload gives some indication of future workload; it is not exact. Also, while record keeping has improved among police departments in the past 20 years, there are many
aspects of policework that remain difficult or impossible to measure accurately. All modern workload-based approaches to police patrol staffing therefore provide guidance but are not meant to be read as rigid prescriptions for staffing.

Through its research across the country, the ICMA has developed guidelines for best practice, collectively known as the Rule of 60 . Community or agency needs can justify different decisions, but in general the ICMA has found that the Rule of 60 guidance balances many concerns well. The Rule of 60 guidelines have two parts:

1. $60 \%$ of all sworn officers should be assigned to patrol and respond to routine incidents.
2. $60 \%$ of patrol officer time should be committed to responding to the service demands of the community.

The first element is straightforward: 60\% of sworn officers (staff with a badge and arrest authority) should be assigned to patrol and respond to routine incidents. The remaining 40\% should be assigned to detectives and other special assignments. While patrol is the backbone of American policing, it is not the only essential function. Departments with more than $60 \%$ of sworn officers engaged in routine patrol may lack specialized skills required for complex investigations; departments with less than $60 \%$ of sworn officers engaged in routine patrol may not have enough capacity to respond to emergencies.

The second element is that $60 \%$ of patrol officer time should be committed to responding to the service demands of the community. The remaining $40 \%$ is not downtime. This element of the Rule of 60 quantifies a basic fact of modern policing: Police officers do more than simply respond to requests for service. Community problem solving, proactive law enforcement, and administrative tasks are essential aspects of policing, and these tasks require time to complete.

On average, the Rule of 60 guidelines have been found to be effective at providing enough coverage to handle workloads while not needlessly overstaffing departments. The Rule of 60 is a benchmark that should be used to guide staffing decisions. These are general guidelines and deviations are expected. It is not the case that $60 \%$ of every shift for every officer will be limited to responding to citizen requests, even when staffing is based on that target.
Sustained deviations from the targets across the agency, however, suggest that staffing changes could be needed.

## Rule 1: $60 \%$ of sworn staff should be dedicated to routine patrol

The first Rule of 60 guideline is that $60 \%$ of a police department should be dedicated to routine response to incidents. BPD's current staffing is summarized in Table 6. Currently, 58 officers and 12 sergeants are dedicated to routine patrol out of 157 currently filled positions. This is just over a third (36.9\%) of current sworn staff. Including the Traffic Unit brings the percentage up to $42.7 \%$ of sworn staff; including Police Training Officers, who conduct field
training for new police academy graduates, the total percentage of sworn staff dedicated to routine patrol services is $45.2 \%$. Including patrol and traffic sergeants and all of the above brings the percentage of sworn staff dedicated to routine patrol services to $54.1 \%$.

Table 6: Current staff summary

|  | Current | Authorized | Vacancies |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Watch I | 20 | 25 | 5 |
| Watch II | 22 | 25 | 3 |
| Watch III | 22 | 26 | 4 |
| Patrol Sergeants | 13 | 13 | - |
| Traffic | 9 | 13 | 4 |
| Traffic Sergeants | 1 | 2 | 1 |
|  |  |  |  |
| Neighborhood Impact Team | 5 | 12 | 7 |
| Command 4 Commanders, 1 Deputy Chief | 5 | 5 | - |
| DUI | - | 2 | 2 |
| Mall | 4 | 6 | 2 |
| Homeless Outreach Team | 2 | 2 | - |
| Homeless Outreach Team Sergeants | 1 | 1 | - |
| Detectives | 16 | 22 | 6 |
| Drug Task Force | 2 | 3 | 1 |
| Special Enforcement Unit | 3 | 4 | 1 |
| Detective Sergeants | 4 | 5 | -1 |
| Community Services Officer | 1 | 1 | - |
| Alcohol / Marijuana | 2 | 3 | 1 |
| Camps | - | 6 |  |
| Officers in Training | 11 | - | - |
|  |  |  |  |
| Chief | 1 | 1 | - |
| Deputy Chief Admin Staff Services | 1 | 1 | - |
| Personnel Commander | 1 | 1 | - |
| Special Service Commander | 1 | 1 | - |
| Training Sergeant | 1 | 1 | - |
| Training Officer | 4 | 4 | - |
| P/E Sergeant | 1 | 1 | - |
| Armorer | 1 | 1 | - |
| PSU (1 Sgt 1 Commander) | 2 | 2 | - |
| Boulder Police Officers Association | 1 | 1 | - |
| Total | 157 | 190 | 33 |

The Boulder Police Department may therefore be slightly over-specialized given its current staffing. Specialized units within BPD were created for specific purposes and are meant to be relieved of responding to routine reactive incidents. Given the nature of these units and the problems they are meant to resolve, it is not recommended that these units be disbanded unless staffing shortages continue.

## Rule 2: 60\% of patrol officer time should be spent on citizen demands for service

The Rule of 60 suggests estimating officer staffing based on the service demands of the community, with $60 \%$ of officer time dedicated to responding to those demands. This analysis therefore excludes proactive activity such as traffic stops and other officer-initiated contacts, which should occupy part of the remaining $40 \%$ of time. We retain reactive incidents, 911 hang ups, and traffic collisions, as these incidents are initiated by citizen requests for service. Given the changes in workload over the entire 2013-2020 period, we further limit these analyses to 2018-2020, the most recent three-year period with full-year data available at the time of the analysis.

The starting point for a Rule of 60 estimate is the total number of incidents that began in each hour over some amount of time. Staffing for annual averages will leave an agency understaffed during some periods due to seasonality. The historic workload analysis above found that there are seasonal components to BPD's workload, with increased property and violent crime incidents in the summer months. From 2018 to 2020, more incidents per day occurred during the months of May through September than in other months. We base our calculations below on the workload during these most busy months to ensure adequate staffing during the summer.

The next step is to calculate the average time required to respond to an incident. This time includes travel time to the incident and officer activity at the incident. After the incident is handled, the officer is clear to respond to another call or resume other activity. The average officer time spent at citizen-initiated incidents was 56.3 minutes from 2018-2020. ${ }^{13}$

When all of an officer's time is spent servicing incidents, the saturation index, or SI is $100 \%$ : $100 \%$ of time is spent on incidents. The number of officers needed to service incidents with an SI of $100 \%$ in each hour can be estimated by multiplying the average number of incidents per hour by the average number of officer-minutes per incident, then dividing by 60 minutes per hour:

[^5]$$
O f c_{S I ~}^{100 \%}=\frac{N_{\text {incidents }} \times \bar{M}_{\text {incident }}}{60}
$$
where:
$O f c_{S I} 100 \%$ is the number of officers needed to meet citizen demand (SI of 100\%);
$N_{\text {incidents }}$ is the number of incidents; and
$\bar{M}_{\text {incident }}$ is the average number of officer-minutes per incident.
This is not the number of officers needed on the street at any given hour. The officers have no time for anything else when the SI is $100 \%$. The Rule of 60 suggests an SI of $60 \%$ to allow for a variety of other tasks. The target is that $60 \%$ of officer time be devoted to servicing citizen demands - the typical number of officer-minutes servicing incidents should therefore be only $60 \%$ of total officer-minutes. We can scale the number of officers needed accordingly:
\[

$$
\begin{gathered}
60 \% \times O f c_{\text {SI } 100 \%}=\frac{N_{\text {incidents }} \times \bar{M}_{\text {incident }}}{60} \\
O f c_{S I ~}^{60 \%} \\
=\frac{N_{\text {incidents }} \times \bar{M}_{\text {incident }}}{60} \times 1 / 60 \%
\end{gathered}
$$
\]

The result of this calculation is an estimate of the number of officers on shift and available to respond to citizen requests for service at that hour required to meet the Rule of 60 guideline. To arrive at the number of officers who should be scheduled to work in that hour, we must add a shift relief factor. Not all officers who are scheduled to work a particular shift are available for patrol service. Sick leave, light duty, training, court, and other happenstances can make officers who were scheduled to work patrol on a particular day and shift unable to do so. This must be included in the staffing estimate to ensure adequate staffing in the real world. The shift relief factor for BPD is $130 \%$.

The Rule of 60 estimate for the number of officers who should be scheduled in each hour is:

$$
\text { Of } c_{\text {scheduled per hour }}=\frac{N_{\text {incidents }} \times \bar{M}_{\text {incident }}}{60} \times 1 / 60 \% \times 130 \%
$$

The $130 \%$ shift relief factor accounts for officers who were scheduled but could not provide patrol service for unscheduled reasons. It requires still more officers to ensure 365-day per year coverage of a shift. Officers must have leave from routine work for training. BPD data shows that officers averaged 165 hours of training per year in 2019. ${ }^{14}$

Officers earn vacation leave, with mid-career officers earning 226 hours of vacation leave each year plus 10 hours of floating holiday leave per the most recent collective bargaining agreement. Officers can also take overtime compensation in the form of comp leave. ${ }^{15}$ Combined, the average officer took 282 hours of these types of leave in 2019. This average

[^6]does not include parental leave. BPD employees are entitled to 12 weeks of parental leave; in 2019 seven employees took this leave. This was approximately 4\% of the sworn workforce in 2019. The average number of parental leave taken per officer is therefore $4 \%$ of 480 hours, or approximately 19 hours per officer in 2019.

In addition to training, vacation leave, a floating holiday, and parental leave, officers have regular days off. In a 14-day pay period, officers will work eight days and have six days off when working 10 -hour shifts, for a total of 1,560 hours of regular days off. Table 7 shows all categories of scheduled time when officers are not available for routine patrol service, which total to 2,026 hours per year.

Table 7: Time off (not available for patrol) each year for officers working 10-hour shifts

| Leave type | Hours per year |
| :--- | ---: |
| Training | 165 |
| Vacation, floating holiday, comp leave <br> Average per officer, 2019 | 282 |
| Parental leave <br> 4\% of sworn workforce $\times$ 480 hours | 19 |
| 6 regular days off in each 14-day pay period <br> 2614-day pay periods $\times 6$ days per period $\times 10$ hours per day | 1,560 |
| Total time off | $\mathbf{2 , 0 2 6}$ |

A single 10-hour shift requires $3,652.5$ hours of work per year, on average. ${ }^{16}$ An average officer cannot work 2,026 of those hours due to training, vacation/holiday/comp leave, parental leave, and regular days off. The number of officers needed to staff a 10-hour shift in BPD yearround is therefore $225 \%$ of the number of officers needed to conduct the work:

$$
\begin{gathered}
\text { Of } c_{\text {payroll }}=\frac{\text { shift-hours per year }}{\text { shift-hours per year }- \text { time off per year }} \times O f c_{\text {scheduled }} \\
\text { Of } c_{\text {payroll }}=\frac{3,652.5}{3,652.5-2,026} \times O f c_{\text {scheduled }} \\
\text { Of } c_{\text {payroll }} \cong 225 \% \times O f c_{\text {scheduled }}
\end{gathered}
$$

For every officer needed on the shift schedule for any given day, about two and a quarter officers are required on the payroll to provide service every day of the year.

We can combine all the above to estimate the number of officers required on the payroll to ensure $60 \%$ of officer time is spent on citizen demands for service (on average) while accounting for both unscheduled and scheduled leave:

$$
\text { Of } c_{\text {payroll per hour }}=\frac{N_{\text {incidents }} \times \bar{M}_{\text {incident }}}{60} \times 1 / 60 \% \times 130 \% \times 225 \%
$$

[^7]Table 8 shows the total number of incidents and average daily incidents in the first two columns. The average daily incidents are multiplied by the average number of minutes (56.3) required to service the incident to find the total officer hours required to be worked per hour (not shown), then divided by the number of minutes in an hour (60) to arrive at the number of officers required on shift to meet citizen demand (SI 100\%).

Table 8: Number of reactive, 911 hangup, and traffic collision incidents by hour

| Number of incidents, May-Sep 2018-2020 |  |  | Officers required on shift |  | Officers required on payroll |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Hour | Total | Avg daily | SI 100\% | SI 60\% | SI 60\% |
| 06 | 1,056 | 2.3 | 2.2 | 3.6 | 10.5 |
| 07 | 1,613 | 3.5 | 3.3 | 5.5 | 16.1 |
| 08 | 2,020 | 4.4 | 4.1 | 6.9 | 20.1 |
| 09 | 2,122 | 4.6 | 4.3 | 7.2 | 21.1 |
| 10 | 2,216 | 4.8 | 4.5 | 7.6 | 22.1 |
| 11 | 2,222 | 4.8 | 4.5 | 7.6 | 22.1 |
| 12 | 2,220 | 4.8 | 4.5 | 7.6 | 22.1 |
| 13 | 2,316 | 5.0 | 4.7 | 7.9 | 23.1 |
| 14 | 2,483 | 5.4 | 5.1 | 8.5 | 24.7 |
| 15 | 2,681 | 5.8 | 5.5 | 9.1 | 26.7 |
| 16 | 2,776 | 6.0 | 5.7 | 9.5 | 27.7 |
| 17 | 2,769 | 6.0 | 5.7 | 9.4 | 27.6 |
| 18 | 2,669 | 5.8 | 5.5 | 9.1 | 26.6 |
| 19 | 2,695 | 5.9 | 5.5 | 9.2 | 26.9 |
| 20 | 2,576 | 5.6 | 5.3 | 8.8 | 25.7 |
| 21 | 2,653 | 5.8 | 5.4 | 9.0 | 26.4 |
| 22 | 3,195 | 7.0 | 6.5 | 10.9 | 31.8 |
| 23 | 3,061 | 6.7 | 6.3 | 10.4 | 30.5 |
| 00 | 2,346 | 5.1 | 4.8 | 8.0 | 23.4 |
| 01 | 1,863 | 4.1 | 3.8 | 6.3 | 18.6 |
| 02 | 1,418 | 3.1 | 2.9 | 4.8 | 14.1 |
| 03 | 1,024 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 3.5 | 10.2 |
| 04 | 802 | 1.7 | 1.6 | 2.7 | 8.0 |
| 05 | 736 | 1.6 | 1.5 | 2.5 | 7.3 |

Notes: Excludes all proactive incidents. Includes all incidents in which one or more sworn officers respond, regardless of assignment.

The number of officers required on shift is divided by $60 \%$ to arrive at the number of officers on shift required to meet the Rule of 60 guideline of $60 \%$ of time spent servicing incidents (SI $60 \%$ ). Finally, this SI $60 \%$ value is multiplied by the shift relief factor of $130 \%$ (not shown), and
that result is multiplied by $225 \%$ to arrive at the number of officers required on the payroll to meet the citizen demand for services, allowing for shift relief (unscheduled leave) and scheduled leave, while maintaining an overall average SI of 60\% in the rightmost column.

## Comparing current hourly patrol staffing to Rule of 60 estimates

Calculating the difference between the number of officers required to maintain a saturation index of $60 \%$ and the current staffing is straightforward. Table 9 shows the current number of officers by hour by watch. The three watches overlap but much of the overlapping time is consumed by writing reports (at the end of a shift) or training during briefings (at the beginning of a shift). This staffing model therefore considers each watch out of service as soon as the next watch begins. While this will not capture every administrative use of the overlapping time, it is a useful approximation of the number of officers available to service citizen demands in any given hour.

Table 9 also shows the number of officers required to meet the Rule of 60 guideline, and the difference between the actual and required number of officers.

On average, BPD has fewer routine patrol officers than would be required to service reactive calls for service, 911 hangups, and traffic collisions from 0800 to 0000 hours. It is only after 0100 that the number of officers on patrol exceeds the historic workload. In particular, the hours of 0300-0700 appear to be overstaffed. The data suggests, however, that officers on Watch III are frequently quite busy early in their shift. During discussions of this apparent overstaffing on Watch III, BPD staff said it was a common practice for Watch III officers to write reports and catch up on other tasks that are not routinely captured in the data used for this analysis during the less busy hours of their shift.

In addition to the three routine patrol watches, the Boulder Police Department has specialized units. These units include the Neighborhood Impact Team, Mall Unit, Community Services Officer, Drug Task Force, Special Enforcement Unit, Regulatory Enforcement Unit, and Detectives. ${ }^{17}$ Except for Detectives, reactive workloads for these units cannot be separated from that of patrol with the available data. These units are intended to be relieved from responding to routine reactive incidents, however, and generally should not be included as available resources for reactive patrol services. These units were designed to solve specific categories of problems, provide investigative services, or to provide extra service to specific geographic areas.

[^8]Table 9: Difference between current patrol staffing and required staffing at SI 60\%

| Hour | Watch |  |  | Officers |  | Difference* |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 1 | II | III | Total Current Patrol | Required for SI 60\% |  |
| 06 | 20 |  | 20 | 20 | 10.5 | +9.5 |
| 07 | 20 |  |  | 20 | 16.1 | +3.9 |
| 08 | 20 |  |  | 20 | 20.1 | -0.1 |
| 09 | 20 |  |  | 20 | 21.1 | -1.1 |
| 10 | 20 |  |  | 20 | 22.1 | -2.1 |
| 11 | 20 |  |  | 20 | 22.1 | -2.1 |
| 12 | 20 |  |  | 20 | 22.1 | -2.1 |
| 13 | 20 |  |  | 20 | 23.1 | -3.1 |
| 14 | 20 | 22 |  | 22 | 24.7 | -2.7 |
| 15 | 20 | 22 |  | 22 | 26.7 | -4.7 |
| 16 |  | 22 |  | 22 | 27.7 | -5.7 |
| 17 |  | 22 |  | 22 | 27.6 | -5.6 |
| 18 |  | 22 |  | 22 | 26.6 | -4.6 |
| 19 |  | 22 |  | 22 | 26.9 | -4.9 |
| 20 |  | 22 |  | 22 | 25.7 | -3.7 |
| 21 |  | 22 | 22 | 22 | 26.4 | -4.4 |
| 22 |  | 22 | 22 | 22 | 31.8 | -9.8 |
| 23 |  | 22 | 22 | 22 | 30.5 | -8.5 |
| 00 |  |  | 22 | 22 | 23.4 | -1.4 |
| 01 |  |  | 22 | 22 | 18.6 | +3.4 |
| 02 |  |  | 22 | 22 | 14.1 | +7.9 |
| 03 |  |  | 22 | 22 | 10.2 | +11.8 |
| 04 |  |  | 22 | 22 | 8.0 | +14.0 |
| 05 |  |  | 22 | 22 | 7.3 | +14.7 |

*Negative differences indicate there are fewer officers than needed, on average, in that hour. Positive differences indicate there are more officers than needed, on average.

The Traffic Unit, however, routinely responds to reactive incidents. While the Traffic Unit's work is $72 \%$ proactive, as previously discussed when analyzing incidents by type (on page 7 above), the Traffic Unit alone handles about 65\% of traffic collisions. Because they are reactive incidents, traffic collisions are included in the number of officers required calculation, both in the number of incidents and in the average officer time per incident.

Traffic Unit officers should be included in our estimates, but they are not the same as patrol officers. The Rule of 60 suggests that $60 \%$ of a patrol officer's workload should be reactive (on average). The Traffic Unit's specialized workload is only $28 \%$ reactive.

As a conservative estimate, it is reasonable to assume that $1 / 4$ of Traffic Unit officer time is spent on reactive incidents such as traffic collisions, with the remaining time spent on
proactive activity. We therefore multiply the number of Traffic Unit officers by 25\%, and add this to the number of patrol officers to arrive at the total number of officers available to respond to reactive incidents.

This calculation is shown in Table 10. Even after including 25\% of the Traffic Unit officer's time, BPD is understaffed by between one and 10 officers from 1300 hours to 0000 hours.

Table 10: Difference between current patrol + traffic staffing and required staffing at SI 60\%

| Hour | Officers |  |  |  | Difference* |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Total Patrol | Traffic Unit Both Shifts ${ }^{\dagger}$ | Routine patrol + traffic | Required for SI 60\% |  |
| 06 | 20 | 1.25 | 21.25 | 10.5 | +10.7 |
| 07 | 20 | 1.25 | 21.25 | 16.1 | +5.2 |
| 08 | 20 | 1.25 | 21.25 | 20.1 | +1.1 |
| 09 | 20 | 2.25 | 22.25 | 21.1 | +1.1 |
| 10 | 20 | 2.25 | 22.25 | 22.1 | +0.2 |
| 11 | 20 | 2.25 | 22.25 | 22.1 | +0.1 |
| 12 | 20 | 2.25 | 22.25 | 22.1 | +0.1 |
| 13 | 20 | 2.25 | 22.25 | 23.1 | -0.8 |
| 14 | 22 | 2.25 | 24.25 | 24.7 | -0.5 |
| 15 | 22 | 2.25 | 24.25 | 26.7 | -2.5 |
| 16 | 22 | 2.25 | 24.25 | 27.7 | -3.4 |
| 17 | 22 | 1 | 23.00 | 27.6 | -4.6 |
| 18 | 22 | 1 | 23.00 | 26.6 | -3.6 |
| 19 | 22 |  | 22.00 | 26.9 | -4.9 |
| 20 | 22 |  | 22.00 | 25.7 | -3.7 |
| 21 | 22 |  | 22.00 | 26.4 | -4.4 |
| 22 | 22 |  | 22.00 | 31.8 | -9.8 |
| 23 | 22 |  | 22.00 | 30.5 | -8.5 |
| 00 | 22 |  | 22.00 | 23.4 | -1.4 |
| 01 | 22 |  | 22.00 | 18.6 | +3.4 |
| 02 | 22 |  | 22.00 | 14.1 | +7.9 |
| 03 | 22 |  | 22.00 | 10.2 | +11.8 |
| 04 | 22 |  | 22.00 | 8.0 | +14.0 |
| 05 | 22 |  | 22.00 | 7.3 | +14.7 |

[^9]
## Adding officers to Watch II and Watch III is likely required

As discussed in the prior section, even after including the Traffic Unit's time spent on reactive incidents, BPD remains understaffed from 1300 to 0000 hours. Fractional officers do not exist, of course, and officers are assigned by 10-hour shift, not each individual hour. We must therefore round up to the next officer, and account for the shift schedule.

One solution for BPD's understaffing during could be to add a fourth watch offset from the others that covers approximately the hours 1600-0100. To add a fourth shift, the existing Watch III would have to be split into two watches, each with approximately 11 officers. Recall that to have one officer on the street, 2.25 officers must be on payroll. A shift with 11 officers on payroll would result in just four or five officers on the street for several overnight hours. Such a small shift causes many practical difficulties. For example, scheduling leave is more difficult with fewer officers. Supervision and mentorship are also more difficult since each shift requires a sergeant and experienced officers to provide mentorship to less experienced officers. Officer safety is also a concern, especially in the event of a critical incident. Adding a fourth shift is therefore not operationally feasible for BPD at this time.

Changing the shift schedule is also unlikely to produce gains in the number of available officers. Increasing the number of patrol officers is therefore the best remaining option.

Readers are reminded that the number of officers needed in the tables in this discussion are based on averages - some days will require more officer-hours during any given hour, other days will require less. A department that staffs for average workloads will find itself shortstaffed a good amount of the time. In general, the maximum average number of officers required in any hour during the shift is the suggested staffing level to ensure adequate coverage.

The current number of officers assigned, the average number of officers needed, and the maximum number of officers is shown in Table 11. The number of officers including the Traffic Unit varies, since the Traffic Unit's shift schedule is different from the three patrol watches; the minimum and maximum number of total officers during the each 10 -hour watch are shown.

Table 11 makes it clear that without the partial time Traffic Unit officers spend on reactive calls, BPD is likely understaffed during an average shift on an average day. Even with these Traffic Unit officers, a typical shift has more work than officers during at least one hour.

Table 11: Current BPD patrol staffing, average and maximum officers needed during shift

|  | Hours | Patrol <br> Officers | Officers <br> Traffic Unit | Hourly avg <br> officers <br> needed | Hourly <br> max <br> officers <br> needed |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Watch |  |  | Suggested <br> number <br> of patrol <br> officers |  |  |
| Watch I | $0600-1600$ | 20 | $21 / 24$ |  |  |
| Watch II | $1400-0000$ | 22 | $22 / 24$ | 21 | 27 |
| Watch III | $2100-0700$ | 22 | $22 / 22$ | 28 | 32 |
|  | Total | $\mathbf{6 4}$ | $\mathbf{6 5 / 7 0}$ | 19 | 32 |

No change is recommended for Watch I. The average reactive service demands for Watch I are close to the current number of officers after including Traffic Unit officer time. The peak demand during Watch I occurs after Watch II starts and can be addressed by Watch II or Traffic Unit officers.

Between six and 10 more officers should be added to Watch II. The reactive service demands for Watch II are largely stable throughout the entire shift. Even during times when Traffic Unit officers are working, Watch II is understaffed. Adding officers to Watch II is therefore recommended, with an addition of at least five more officers on this shift to ensure average demand can be met during hours when Traffic Unit officers are not scheduled. Planning for peak demand on Watch II would require adding 10 more officers during this shift. This demand peak occurs after Watch III starts, however, and can be partially addressed by Watch III officers.

Recommendations for staffing on Watch III are more difficult. Watch III has strong demand at the beginning of the shift, from 2100 hours to 0000 hours. Directly staffing Watch III for this peak demand would leave the remainder of Watch III overstaffed. Demand for reactive services drops off sharply after 0000, and by 0300 hours, 11 or fewer officers are needed to meet the demand for reactive service. ${ }^{18}$ Adding a large number of officers to Watch III is therefore not recommended, but adding two to four officers to Watch III would help ease the workload on Watch II officers early in their shift.

Overall, BPD should add six to 10 officers to Watch II and two to four officers to Watch III, for a total of between eight and 14 additional officers above current staffing levels.

[^10]
## Recommendations

Recommendation 1: BPD should add between 8 and 14 patrol officers (total) to Watches II and III
The Boulder Police Department currently staffs three patrol watches. BPD patrol is split into three overlapping 10-hour watches (shifts): Watch I is $0600-1600$; Watch II is $1400-0000$; Watch III is $2100-0700$. Currently, there are 20 officers assigned to Watch I, 22 officers assigned to Watch II, and 22 officers assigned to Watch III.

Watch II is particularly understaffed. An additional six to 10 officers should be assigned to this watch. Citizen demand continues through the end of Watch II and through the beginning of Watch III; two to four officers should be added to Watch III. As discussed in the next recommendation, new officers are required. The suggested patrol staffing likely cannot be achieved through reassigning existing officers.

Recommendation 2: Vacant patrol positions should be filled, and BPD should focus on recruitment and retention of officers.
While this is perhaps an obvious recommendation, the vacancy rate at BPD is a concern that requires discussion. The lower bound of the suggested number of patrol officers on all three Watches is 71 total officers - the same as the currently-authorized number of patrol officers. No police department can maintain staffing at $100 \%$ of authorized levels due to retirements. It also takes time to train new officers, or to train existing officers for new positions.

A detailed treatment of officer recruitment and retention are beyond the scope of this report, but recent work ${ }^{19}$ by the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) suggests that recruitment and retention is a problem for police departments nationwide. Reductions in hiring combined with accelerating resignations and retirements are not unique to BPD. Still, PERF found that the nationwide average vacancy rate for authorized sworn positions for agencies with 50-249 sworn officers was 6.6\%; BPD has a vacancy rate of $17.4 \%$.

These are not abstract numbers without consequence. If BPD's vacancy rate were the nationwide average of $6.6 \%$, it would have 20 more sworn officers than it does today across the entire agency. Particularly among the three patrol watches, there are currently 12 vacant positions. This is the more than half of the number of officers currently assigned to each of Watches I and II. Up to six of these vacancies may be filled by prospective officers currently in academy. Even if all of these trainees successfully complete their training ${ }^{20}$ and all were

[^11]assigned to patrol, BPD would still have six vacancies in patrol - one-third of a shift assuming no further reassignment or attrition. ${ }^{21}$

This report is focused on patrol officers and cannot examine every specialized unit.
Nevertheless, it bears mentioning that there are vacancies across nearly every unit. It is likely that hiring new patrol officers will result in existing patrol officers being reassigned to fill these vacancies outside of patrol.

Achieving a net increase in the number of patrol officers will therefore require hiring closer to 30 officers, assuming the vacancies within special units are filled with existing patrol officers. Assuming a 5\% attrition rate (approximately 10 officers per year), and assuming that not all recruits complete both police academy and field training, a net increase of 30 officers requires hiring and training 18-19 new officers per year in each of the next five years.

Recommendation 3: BPD may not be able to maintain its current specialized units and should consider disbanding some units if current sworn staffing cannot be increased. Like BPD patrol, each specialized unit has current vacancies. Disbanding some units may be necessary given the small number of officers available to staff specialized units. The Mall Unit, for example, currently has just four officers and one sergeant. Given shift relief and scheduled leave, fewer than two officers are available to work that unit on average each day. The Boulder Police Department may be facing difficult choices in the future regarding specialized units and the workloads they perform if sworn staffing cannot be increased. It may be necessary to disband one or more specialized units and return those officers to patrol service if the current staffing situation continues.

## Recommendation 4: BPD should continue to enhance its problem-solving capability to address increasing crime

The Boulder Police Department's core workload has changed substantially over the study period (2013-2020). Every finding from the dispatch data provided to the research team, as well as standardized Uniform Crime Reports data from the FBI, shows an increase in property crime and violent crime incidents. These increases were steady over the period, suggesting a slowly changing context in the City of Boulder. Determining the nature of these crime problems is outside of the scope of this report, but research consistently shows that a purely reactive posture by a police department is unlikely to address crime problems. Solving crime problems requires technically sophisticated analysis grounded in the everyday experiences of line-level officers, combined with command staff and line-level officers willing to try new strategies and tactics to identify and solve public safety problems. Implementing long-term solutions in partnership with community stakeholders will require a combination of sworn and civilian employees dedicated to the task. Additional resources are likely required to do

[^12]this. Implementing a problem-oriented approach also requires a political environment conducive to allowing innovation embedded in a cycle of continuous improvement that embraces taking risks on new approaches and learning from mistakes.

The Boulder Police Department has already made strides in this direction. After this report was commissioned but prior its completion, BPD hired a crime analyst who will soon receive a PhD in criminal justice and has a background in sophisticated, theory-informed and datadriven policy analysis. During discussions of drafts of this report, BPD command staff also clearly articulated a desire to not only implement problem-oriented policing approaches, but to become a national leader in problem solving.

## Summary

Boulder Police Department's workload has changed from 2013 to 2021. Compared to years past, more recent years have seen far fewer traffic stops and an increasing number of property and violent crime incidents. These changes were relatively gradual over the period, with no large changes in any one year. In 2013, 46.8\% of BPD incidents were proactive. By 2019, just $27.8 \%$ of incidents were proactive and $25.7 \%$ of incidents were proactive in 2020. The average time to clear an incident increased from 37.8 minutes in 2013 to 47.5 minutes in 2019 and 46.5 minutes in 2020. When controlling for incident type, the average officer-minutes per incident is constant - the workload has changed, not how long it takes to complete any given incident. At the same time, the average number of minutes between calls has changed as well, suggesting an increased pace of the work as well.

Four recommendations were offered. First, BPD should add between eight and 14 patrol officers (total) to Watches II and III. Watch II, in particular, was found to be understaffed. Second, BPD must fill vacant positions and must retain existing officers. This is admittedly a difficult task in the current national employment market. Third, BPD should consider disbanding one or more of its specialized units if it cannot increase the number of patrol officers. This may become an operational necessity. Finally, BPD should continue to invest in problem-solving capacity and be willing to engage in innovative crime prevention strategies to combat increasing crime in its service area.

## Appendix

## Data preparation

BPD extracted early years of data (2013-2017) from an archival system. Recent data (20182021) was extracted from data systems currently in use. In general, the data generating process appeared to be consistent across years with no obvious cause for concern. However, the data may not be directly comparable across years in every detail. Readers should view comparisons between the 2013-2017 data and 2018-2020 data with caution.

BPD provided two sets of files: 1) incident-level files, and 2) unit-level files. These files were linked by incident ID. Incident-level files were the primary files used. Unit-level files were used to calculate officer time spent on incidents, calculated as the time elapsed between each unit being assigned to the incident and the unit clearing the incident. Time spent on each incident was summed across all units.

Data removed from the analysis
Computer-aided dispatch (CAD) systems are designed to ensure orderly dispatch of police officers for public safety operational purposes. The requirements for such a system are not always the same as archival research requirements, such as this analysis. Some manipulation of raw CAD data is therefore necessary to accurately estimate both the number of incidents and officer time spent on those incidents.

925,158 incident records were provided. Incidents with a disposition of duplicate, call canceled, call handled / aired by dispatch, and employee error were dropped ( $n=91,804$ ).

BPD dispatch records incident types for several types of civilian employees in addition to sworn staff (Brad Riggin, personal communication 11/9/2021). These civilian employees include CPC employees, accident report specialists, and building/planning enforcement. Sworn staff included BPD executive staff, BPD commanders, BPD sergeants, BPD detectives, and BPD patrol/traffic officers. Incidents that had one or more of these sworn staff respond were retained while all others were dropped ( $n=342,565$ )

Dispatch records some information-only items as incidents (Brad Riggin, personal communication 10/7/2021). These incidents often have officers assigned, with no officer recorded as having arrived at any location. These incident types were dropped ( $n=1,158$ ):

- PHONEB-Phone Message
- M1B-Message 1
- M1LIB-Message 1 Low Impact
- M1RFB-Message 1 Red Flag
- M2B-Message 2
- M2LIB-Message 2 Low Impact
- M3B-Message 3
- M4B-Message 4
- HOLDB - Held Incident
- INFORB-Information
- PAGEB-Page
- MEDIAB-Media Requests
- PWREQB-Public Works Request

The result was a data file with 489,631 incidents from January 2013 to September 29, 2021 (the date the data were extracted).

| Category | Problem Type |
| :---: | :---: |
| Admin | Attempt to Locate <br> Directed Patrol <br> Extra Patrol - Community Requested <br> Follow-Up <br> Foot Patrol |
| Alarm | Hold-up/Panic/Duress <br> Intrusion Alarm Other Alarm |
| Court Orders | Restraining Order - Cold Incident <br> Restraining Order - Just Occurred <br> Restraining Order In-Progress <br> Warrant Arrest |
| Drugs | Drug Task Force |

Fire Alarm
Fire Assist
Non-Structure Fire
Structure Fire
Wildland Fire

| Category | Problem Type |
| :--- | :--- |
|  | 911 Hang-up |
|  | AED Medical Call |
|  | Assist |
|  | Civil Assist |
|  | Found Child |
|  | Found Property |
|  | Hazard |
| Medical / Assist | Lost Child |
|  | Lost Property |
|  | Medical Call |
|  | Minor Hazmat |
|  | Missing Person |
|  | Natural Gas Odor Indoors |
|  | Odor Invest |
|  | Open Door |
|  | Other Agency Assist |
|  | Rescue |
|  | Smoke/Electric Smell Inside |
|  | Vehicle Stalled in Traffic |
|  | Water Rescues |
|  | Welfare Check |


| Category | Problem Name Translation |
| :--- | :--- |
|  | Animal Complaint |
|  | Code Enforcement |
|  | Disturbance - Cold Incident |
|  | Disturbance - Just Occurred |
|  | Disturbance In-Progress |
|  | Drunk Person |
|  | Fire Works Complaints |
| Nuisance | Liquor Law |
|  | Littering |
|  | Loitering |
|  | Noise Complaint |
|  | Nuisance Party |
|  | Open Container |
|  | Public Health Order Violation |
|  | Runaway |
|  | Smoking Violation |


| Other | Other <br> Unknown Problem <br> Walk-In Report |
| :--- | :--- |
| Non-traffic Proactive | Officer-Initiated Event <br> Pedestrian Contact <br> Self-Initiated Officer |


| Category | Problem Name Translation |
| :--- | :--- |
|  | Burglary - Cold Incident |
|  | Burglary - Just Occurred |
|  | Burglary In-Progress |
|  | Criminal Mischief - Cold Incident |
|  | Criminal Mischief - Just Occurred |
|  | Criminal Mischief In-Progress |
|  | Fraud - Cold Incident |
|  | Fraud - Just Occurred |
|  | Fraud In-Progress |
|  | Prowler |
| Property | Recovered Stolen Property |
|  | Shoplifter |
|  | Suspicious - Cold Incident |
|  | Suspicious - Just Occurred |
|  | Suspicious In-Progress |
|  | Theft - Cold Incident |
|  | Theft - Just Occurred |
|  | Theft In-Progress |
|  | Trespassing - Cold Incident |
|  | Trespassing - Just Occurred |
|  | Trespassing In-Progress |
|  | Vehicle Trespass - Cold Incident |
| Sex Crimes | Vehicle Trespass - Just Occurred |
|  | Vehicle Trespass In-Progress |
|  | Indecent Exposure - Cold Incident |
|  | Indecent Exposure - Just Occurred |
| Indecent Exposure In-Progress |  |
|  | Sex Assault - Cold Incident |
|  | Sex Assault - Just Occurred |
|  | Sex Assault In-Progress |

Category Problem Name Translation

|  | Abandoned Vehicle |
| :--- | :--- |
|  | DUI |
|  | Hit/Run Accident - Cold Incident |
|  | Hit/Run Accident - Just Occurred |
|  | Injury Accident - Cold Incident |
| Traffic / parking | Injury Accident - Just Occurred |
|  | Major Accident |
|  | Parking Complaint/Issue |
|  | Photo Radar |
|  | Property Damage - Vehicle Accident |
|  | Scofflaw Impound |
|  | Traffic Complaint |
|  | Traffic Stop |
|  | Vehicle Accident - Unknown Injury |
|  | Vehicle Relocation |


| Category | Problem Name Translation |
| :---: | :---: |
| Violent | Assault - Cold Incident |
|  | Assault - Just Occurred |
|  | Assault In-Progress |
|  | Bomb Threat |
|  | Child Abuse - Cold Incident |
|  | Child Abuse - Just Occurred |
|  | Child Abuse In-Progress |
|  | Domestic Disturbance - Cold Incident |
|  | Domestic Disturbance - Just Occurred |
|  | Domestic Disturbance In-Progress |
|  | Harassment - Cold Incident |
|  | Harassment - Just Occurred |
|  | Harassment In-Progress |
|  | Kidnapping - Cold Incident |
|  | Kidnapping - Just Occurred |
|  | Kidnapping In-Progress |
|  | Menacing - Cold Incident |
|  | Menacing - Just Occurred |
|  | Menacing In-Progress |
|  | Reckless Endangerment |
|  | Robbery - Cold Incident |
|  | Robbery - Just Occurred |
|  | Robbery In-Progress |
|  | Shooting |
|  | Shots Heard - Cold Incident |
|  | Shots Heard - Just Occurred |
|  | Shots Heard In-Progress |
|  | Stabbing |
|  | Weapon - Cold Incident |
|  | Weapon - Just Occurred |
|  | Weapon In-Progress |

Average officer time, number of officers, and percent of incidents with more than one officer by incident type and year Table 13: Average officer time, number of officers, and percent of incidents with more than 1 officer arriving by year and incident type

|  | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | Total |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Admin |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Avg. Officer-minutes | 34.74 | 36.31 | 42.35 | 45.3 | 50.25 | 43.88 | 39.69 | 41.55 | 36.22 | 41.06 |
| Avg. N officers | 1.21 | 1.24 | 1.25 | 1.24 | 1.24 | 1.28 | 1.27 | 1.26 | 1.24 | 1.25 |
| \% incidents > 1 ofc | 16\% | 19\% | 18\% | 18\% | 16\% | 20\% | 20\% | 18\% | 17\% | 18\% |
| Alarm |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Avg. Officer-minutes | 20.3 | 18.31 | 20.62 | 19.39 | 21.4 | 22.97 | 25.57 | 26.06 | 23.92 | 21.49 |
| Avg. N officers | 1.27 | 1.26 | 1.25 | 1.24 | 1.26 | 1.34 | 1.35 | 1.43 | 1.49 | 1.3 |
| \% incidents > 1 ofc | 22\% | 21\% | 20\% | 18\% | 20\% | 27\% | 25\% | 28\% | 32\% | 23\% |
| Court Orders |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Avg. Officer-minutes | 114.3 | 115.9 | 124.64 | 135.4 | 133.12 | 155.25 | 129.54 | 175.22 | 158.13 | 134.28 |
| Avg. N officers | 1.74 | 1.86 | 1.77 | 1.81 | 1.82 | 2 | 2 | 2.31 | 2.04 | 1.89 |
| \% incidents > 1 ofc | 52\% | 57\% | 64\% | 59\% | 60\% | 63\% | 68\% | 75\% | 67\% | 62\% |
| Drugs |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Avg. Officer-minutes | 47.18 | 50.24 | 66.97 | 67.26 | 55.98 | 65.41 | 48.1 | 49.75 | 52.01 | 57.03 |
| Avg. N officers | 1.41 | 1.38 | 1.47 | 1.42 | 1.36 | 1.51 | 1.38 | 1.33 | 1.37 | 1.41 |
| \% incidents > 1 ofc | 33\% | 29\% | 32\% | 32\% | 29\% | 34\% | 31\% | 25\% | 28\% | 31\% |
| Fire |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Avg. Officer-minutes | 42.44 | 65.87 | 44.79 | 59.17 | 44.34 | 54.55 | 48.8 | 56.47 | 47.3 | 52.01 |
| Avg. N officers | 1.55 | 1.72 | 1.56 | 1.69 | 1.63 | 1.69 | 1.66 | 1.73 | 1.66 | 1.65 |
| \% incidents > 1 ofc | 32\% | 35\% | 32\% | 33\% | 38\% | 38\% | 38\% | 43\% | 42\% | 36\% |


|  | $\mathbf{2 0 1 3}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 4}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 5}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 6}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 7}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 8}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 9}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 2 0}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 2 1}$ | Total |
| :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Medical / Assist |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Avg. Officer-minutes | 47.1 | 47.9 | 53.44 | 52.03 | 52.22 | 52.45 | 49.7 | 50.31 | 47.95 | $\mathbf{5 0 . 4 3}$ |
| Avg. N officers | 1.46 | 1.49 | 1.51 | 1.5 | 1.51 | 1.51 | 1.49 | 1.54 | 1.52 | $\mathbf{1 . 5}$ |
| \% incidents > 1 ofc | $33 \%$ | $34 \%$ | $36 \%$ | $34 \%$ | $36 \%$ | $37 \%$ | $36 \%$ | $39 \%$ | $38 \%$ | $\mathbf{3 6 \%}$ |
| Nuisance |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Avg. Officer-minutes | 39.73 | 42.66 | 44.56 | 44.11 | 43.13 | 45.01 | 43.47 | 37.01 | 37.79 | $\mathbf{4 1 . 9}$ |
| Avg. N officers | 1.56 | 1.63 | 1.61 | 1.57 | 1.54 | 1.6 | 1.63 | 1.55 | 1.58 | $\mathbf{1 . 5 8}$ |
| \% incidents > 1 ofc | $38 \%$ | $42 \%$ | $39 \%$ | $38 \%$ | $36 \%$ | $41 \%$ | $43 \%$ | $37 \%$ | $39 \%$ | $\mathbf{3 9 \%}$ |
| Other |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Avg. Officer-minutes | 108.38 | 73 | 67.6 | 69.88 | 84.9 | 97.64 | 112.58 | 88.52 | 128.52 | $\mathbf{9 2 . 5 3}$ |
| Avg. N officers | 1.41 | 1.36 | 1.29 | 1.36 | 1.43 | 1.45 | 1.42 | 1.52 | 1.57 | $\mathbf{1 . 4 2}$ |
| \% incidents > 1 ofc | $20 \%$ | $22 \%$ | $20 \%$ | $21 \%$ | $24 \%$ | $24 \%$ | $25 \%$ | $30 \%$ | $30 \%$ | $\mathbf{2 4 \%}$ |
| Non-traffic Proactive |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Avg. Officer-minutes | 27.21 | 26.23 | 27.88 | 29.25 | 29.12 | 37.69 | 32.6 | 27.72 | 24.17 | $\mathbf{2 8 . 9 5}$ |
| Avg. N officers | 1.3 | 1.33 | 1.34 | 1.32 | 1.32 | 1.41 | 1.38 | 1.37 | 1.33 | $\mathbf{1 . 3 4}$ |
| \% incidents > 1 ofc | $24 \%$ | $26 \%$ | $26 \%$ | $25 \%$ | $25 \%$ | $30 \%$ | $28 \%$ | $27 \%$ | $25 \%$ | $\mathbf{2 6 \%}$ |
| Property |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Avg. Officer-minutes | 57.14 | 60.88 | 66.5 | 65.07 | 62.85 | 62.15 | 60.84 | 55.53 | 54 | $\mathbf{6 0 . 5}$ |
| Avg. N officers | 1.61 | 1.66 | 1.67 | 1.63 | 1.6 | 1.61 | 1.68 | 1.69 | 1.7 | $\mathbf{1 . 6 5}$ |
| \% incidents > 1 ofc | $42 \%$ | $43 \%$ | $41 \%$ | $42 \%$ | $41 \%$ | $42 \%$ | $47 \%$ | $48 \%$ | $48 \%$ | $\mathbf{4 4 \%}$ |
| Sex Crimes |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Avg. Officer-minutes | 161.42 | 142.32 | 131.77 | 149.82 | 120.05 | 122.68 | 98.31 | 76.98 | 92.43 | $\mathbf{1 1 9 . 0 6}$ |
| Avg. N officers | 1.92 | 2.01 | 2.01 | 2.04 | 1.76 | 1.85 | 1.8 | 1.75 | 1.89 | $\mathbf{1 . 8 8}$ |
| \% incidents > 1 ofc | $52 \%$ | $58 \%$ | $58 \%$ | $54 \%$ | $49 \%$ | $47 \%$ | $50 \%$ | $45 \%$ | $48 \%$ | $\mathbf{5 1 \%}$ |


|  | $\mathbf{2 0 1 3}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 4}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 5}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 6}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 7}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 8}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 9}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 2 0}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 2 1}$ | Total |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Traffic |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Avg. Officer-minutes | 23.57 | 23.95 | 26.62 | 27.94 | 29.95 | 30.78 | 29.96 | 29.67 | 31.39 | $\mathbf{2 7 . 1 7}$ |
| Avg. N officers | 1.19 | 1.22 | 1.21 | 1.2 | 1.23 | 1.23 | 1.23 | 1.25 | 1.3 | $\mathbf{1 . 2 2}$ |
| \% incidents > 1 ofc | $16 \%$ | $17 \%$ | $17 \%$ | $15 \%$ | $17 \%$ | $17 \%$ | $17 \%$ | $18 \%$ | $21 \%$ | $\mathbf{1 7 \%}$ |
| Violent |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Avg. Officer-minutes | 118.75 | 124.4 | 123.73 | 121.04 | 113.44 | 122.41 | 106.42 | 105.17 | 95.38 | $\mathbf{1 1 3 . 9 9}$ |
| Avg. N officers | 2.16 | 2.25 | 2.24 | 2.17 | 2.12 | 2.17 | 2.12 | 2.2 | 2.07 | $\mathbf{2 . 1 7}$ |
| \% incidents > 1 ofc | $58 \%$ | $61 \%$ | $60 \%$ | $60 \%$ | $58 \%$ | $63 \%$ | $60 \%$ | $63 \%$ | $58 \%$ | $\mathbf{6 0 \%}$ |
| Total |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Avg. Officer-minutes | 37.76 | 38.91 | 43.15 | 44.83 | 47.42 | 49.53 | 47.52 | 46.48 | 45.15 | $\mathbf{4 4 . 1 8}$ |
| Avg. N officers | 1.37 | 1.4 | 1.41 | 1.41 | 1.44 | 1.47 | 1.48 | 1.52 | 1.51 | $\mathbf{1 . 4 4}$ |
| \% incidents > 1 ofc | $26 \%$ | $28 \%$ | $28 \%$ | $28 \%$ | $30 \%$ | $32 \%$ | $33 \%$ | $35 \%$ | $34 \%$ | $\mathbf{3 0 \%}$ |

Table 14: Incidents by type and year

|  | $\mathbf{2 0 1 3}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 4}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 5}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 6}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 7}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 8}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 9}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 2 0}$ | Total |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Admin | 4,362 | 4,833 | 4,645 | 4,511 | 4,161 | 4,987 | 5,520 | 5,532 | $\mathbf{3 8 , 5 5 1}$ |
| Alarm | 1,906 | 2,277 | 2,097 | 2,307 | 1,983 | 1,353 | 1,299 | 1,463 | $\mathbf{1 4 , 6 8 5}$ |
| Court Orders | 458 | 548 | 484 | 561 | 465 | 454 | 304 | 294 | $\mathbf{3 , 5 6 8}$ |
| Drugs | 212 | 294 | 363 | 394 | 388 | 376 | 364 | 267 | $\mathbf{2 , 6 5 8}$ |
| Fire | 459 | 498 | 436 | 451 | 402 | 338 | 334 | 413 | $\mathbf{3 , 3 3 1}$ |
| Medical / Assist | 9,493 | 9,336 | 9,578 | 9,668 | 9,687 | 9,803 | 10,466 | 9,370 | $\mathbf{7 7 , 4 0 1}$ |
| Nuisance | 7,237 | 7,288 | 7,171 | 7,454 | 7,976 | 7,715 | 8,134 | 9,792 | $\mathbf{6 2 , 7 6 7}$ |
| Other | 773 | 840 | 702 | 656 | 698 | 780 | 1,012 | 750 | $\mathbf{6 , 2 1 1}$ |
| Non-traffic proactive | 8,035 | 7,498 | 6,166 | 5,713 | 4,755 | 4,773 | 3,825 | 3,284 | $\mathbf{4 4 , 0 4 9}$ |
| Property | 5,704 | 5,885 | 5,688 | 6,679 | 6,570 | 6,726 | 7,092 | 7,964 | $\mathbf{5 2 , 3 0 8}$ |
| Sex Crimes | 165 | 183 | 184 | 194 | 211 | 243 | 254 | 252 | $\mathbf{1 , 6 8 6}$ |
| Traffic | 23,644 | 23,122 | 19,598 | 18,718 | 12,983 | 12,251 | 11,037 | 8,312 | $\mathbf{1 2 9 , 6 6 5}$ |
| Violent | 1,716 | 1,792 | 1,805 | 2,089 | 2,372 | 2,204 | 2,276 | 2,745 | $\mathbf{1 6 , 9 9 9}$ |
| Total | 64,164 | $\mathbf{6 4 , 3 9 4}$ | 58,917 | 59,395 | 52,651 | 52,003 | $\mathbf{5 1 , 9 1 7}$ | $\mathbf{5 0 , 4 3 8}$ | $\mathbf{4 5 3 , 8 7 9}$ |

Notes:

1. Partial data were available for 2021 ; that year is therefore omitted.
2. Incident type was missing for 26 incidents.

[^0]:    1 "Serviced" means at least one sworn unit was recorded by dispatch as having arrived at the incident.

[^1]:    ${ }^{2}$ Summing in-progress, just occurred, and cold incidents, assaults increased to 398 in 2020 from 341 in 2013. There were 373 assault incidents in 2019.
    ${ }^{3}$ Summing in-progress, just occurred, and cold incidents, domestic disturbances increased to 706 in 2020 from 527 in 2013. There were 636 domestic disturbance incidents in 2019.
    ${ }^{4}$ Summing in-progress, just occurred, and cold incidents, harassment increased to 1,089 in 2020 from 544 in 2013. There were 804 harassment incidents in 2019.
    ${ }^{5}$ Summing in-progress, just occurred, and cold incidents, menacing increased to 100 in 2020 from 16 in 2013. There were 166 menacing incidents in 2019.
    ${ }^{6}$ Summing in-progress, just occurred, and cold incidents, shots heard increased to 129 in 2020 from 96 in 2013. There were 124 shots heard incidents in 2019.
    ${ }^{7}$ Summing in-progress, just occurred, and cold incidents, weapons increased to 131 in 2020 from 66 in 2013. There were 95 weapons incidents in 2019.

[^2]:    ${ }^{8}$ UCR data provided by the FBI's Crime Data Explorer at https://crime-data-explorer.fr.cloud.gov/pages/explorer/crime/crime-trend, retrieved 23 Oct 2021.
    ${ }^{9}$ Property crimes (summarized NIBRS offenses) increased from 2,949 in 2013 to 4,019 in 2020. There were 3,316 property crimes reported to NIBRS in 2019.
    ${ }^{10}$ Violent crimes (summarized NIBRS offenses) increased from 218 in 2013 to 343 in 2020 . There were 277 violent crimes reported to NIBRS in 2019.

[^3]:    ${ }^{11}$ Due to the changes since 2013 discussed above and having partial-year data from 2021, this section will use a three-year average from 2018-2020.

[^4]:    ${ }^{12}$ Response area, the field from which district was extracted, is more sparsely populated prior to 2018, and partialyear data were available for 2021. This section therefore uses data from 2018-2020.

[^5]:    ${ }^{13}$ The average officer-minutes for all incidents, shown in Table 2, includes proactive incidents. Proactive incidents consume an average of 26.2 officer-minutes each from 2018-2020. The overall increase in officer time per incident shown in Table 2 is due to the shift from proactive to reactive incidents over the study period; these average times while holding incident type constant are similar across the entire 2013-2020 period.

[^6]:    ${ }^{14}$ This average includes SWAT trained officers, who train for 20 hours a month and are unavailable for routine incidents while training. Leave estimates were drawn from 2019 to avoid pandemic-related effects in 2020.
    ${ }^{15}$ There are a variety of circumstances where officers must work overtime, such as an arrest or critical incident late in their shift. BPD officers have the choice of receiving overtime pay or comp leave for overtime worked.

[^7]:    ${ }^{16}$ There are approximately 365.25 days in a year, including an adjustment for leap years.

[^8]:    ${ }^{17}$ BPD also employs civilians for accident response, photo enforcement, code enforcement, animal protection, and other tasks. This report is limited to sworn patrol workloads; the workload for civilian units is outside of this report's scope.

[^9]:    †The number of Traffic Unit officers has been multiplied by $25 \%$, to account for their mostly proactive workload.
    *Negative differences indicate there are fewer officers than needed, on average, in that hour. Positive differences indicate there are more officers than needed, on average.

[^10]:    ${ }^{18}$ Feedback from BPD command staff on earlier drafts of this report suggested that Watch III officers frequently write reports, take their lunch break, and catch up on other tasks that are not captured in the data available for this staffing model during the early morning hours with few reactive incidents. Given how busy these officers are early in their shift, this exp

[^11]:    ${ }^{19}$ See https://www.policeforum.org/workforcesurveyjune2021.
    ${ }^{20}$ Nationally, the average completion rate for police academies is approximately $86 \%$. See https://bjs.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh236/files/media/document/slleta18st.pdf.

[^12]:    ${ }^{21}$ Precise measure of BPD's attrition rate were not available as of this writing, but it was estimated at 10-12 officers per year prior to the pandemic.

